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In this book Nyden-Bullock traces the development of Spinoza’s political 
and philosophical views from his early encounters with the intellectually 
stimulating figures of the Amsterdam ‘Radical Cartesian Circle’ through the 
completion of his magnum opus, the Ethics. Nyden-Bullock discusses in some 
detail both the Radical Cartesian pamphlets to which Spinoza was exposed 
and the key individuals with whom he interacted during the time that he 
was developing his own philosophical views. She concludes that Spinoza’s 
political writings were strongly impacted by the views of his friends and as-
sociates in the Radical Cartesian Circle, and that while Spinoza’s own ma-
ture epistemological views were in part a result of his rejection of Descartes’ 
metaphysical dualism, they were also affected by his attempt to develop a 
coherent Cartesian political theory.
Nyden-Bullock begins her study in Chapter 1 with a general overview of 
the political conditions and the rise of Cartesianism in the Netherlands just 
prior to and during Spinoza’s lifetime. The philosophical controversy of the 
time included a transition from scholastic Aristotelianism to the new and 
exciting ideas of Galileo, Hobbes, and Descartes. The changes included pas-
sionate discussions in the fields of philosophy theology, politics, and religion. 
Indeed, debates on these topics were feverish and continuous among schol-
ars, politicians, religious leaders, and the general public. This resulted in a 
change in the status of philosophy itself, from a subservient academic posi-
tion to a field of study that was newly understood to have its own power and 
meaning independent from any other discipline.
In the second and third chapters Nyden-Bullock discusses the Radical 
Cartesian pamphlets of Lambertus van Velthuysen and the De la Court 
brothers, and the political views of some of Spinoza’s associates in the Am-
sterdam Circle. All of these thinkers are tied together by their beliefs in the 
views of Descartes and Hobbes regarding the role of reason in controlling the 
passions and the universal human drive for self-preservation — ideas well 
known to Spinoza scholars. Nyden-Bullock argues that Spinoza’s close asso-
ciation with the Radical Cartesian group provides very strong evidence that 
Spinoza was thinking about the connection between epistemology, politics, 
and religion throughout his entire philosophical career. Further, she shows 
that given the overlapping views expressed in the writings of Spinoza and 
the other Radical Cartesians, it is virtually impossible to determine in which 
direction the lines of influence traveled between Spinoza and his Radical 
Cartesian associates.
The focus of Chapter 4 is on the content of Spinoza’s political views and 
the order in which his political, metaphysical, and epistemological ideas de-
veloped. Nyden-Bullock argues that rather than creating his metaphysical 
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system first and then expounding on the political views that easily follow 
from that system, it was the other way around, with Spinoza’s political views 
giving birth to his mature metaphysical and epistemological theories. Indeed, 
in the Theological-Political Treatise we see many of Spinoza’s more devel-
oped metaphysical and epistemological views. Nyden-Bullock again shows 
the ties between Spinoza and his associates. The central tenets of Spinoza’s 
political theory — that true wisdom and knowledge are based on reason, that 
the social nature of human beings necessarily entails the drive toward self-
preservation, that salvation requires knowledge, and that a healthy society 
(of which the highest form is a democracy) occurs only through the rule of 
reason — were views that were held by the members of the Amsterdam Radi-
cal Cartesian Circle. She also points out that the earliest version of Spinoza’s 
‘three kinds of knowledge’ (i.e., imagination, reason, and intuition), which 
is central to his mature epistemology, is found in van den Eden’s Free Politi-
cal Propositions. Her conclusion is that Spinoza’s systematization of Radical 
Cartesian politics played a very large role in the development of his complete 
philosophical theory — entailing his metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, 
and political views. 
The book’s last three chapters trace the development of Spinoza’s thoughts 
on error, truth, and falsity from the early ‘Cartesian’ stage found in his Ap-
pendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts (CM) to the middle ‘transitional’ 
stage in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (TIE) and the Short 
Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being (KV), through the ‘mature’ stage 
of his epistemology in the Ethics (78). Chapter 5 is dedicated to the early 
stage in which Spinoza begins to distinguish his views from those of Des-
cartes. For example, in the early stage Spinoza still accepts the ideas that 
error results when the will extends itself beyond the scope of the intellect, 
that the will is free, and that the will and intellect are distinct from one an-
other. However, Spinoza begins to strike out on his own when he offers both 
his own definition of the will and a new way of understanding the distinction 
between the will and the intellect. For Spinoza, the will is free in the sense 
that the mental acts that we call volitions never follow from causes that are 
external to the human mind; rather, any volition is caused by the mind alone. 
Also, for Spinoza the will is the active portion of the mind while the intellect 
is passive.
In Chapter 6 Nyden-Bullock shows that in the transitional stage Spinoza 
continues to distinguish his own from Descartes’ epistemology, by means of 
his monistic ontology and unique view of the mind-body relationshiIn the 
TIE he begins to develop his view that the primary goal of humankind is 
to have true knowledge of the connection between the mind and the body, 
and the relationship between the self and the entire universe, including its 
cause, i.e., God. Nyden-Bullock argues that the main problem with the TIE 
is that it does not complete what it sets out to accomplish: it does not ex-
plain why an idea corresponds with its object, and hence, it does not explain 
the nature of the mind-body union. Nyden-Bullock says that in the KV we 
find the first textual evidence of Spinoza’s denial of free will — a view in 
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direct conflict with Descartes. Also, Spinoza begins to reject the will-intel-
lect distinction, claiming that if they were really distinct from one another, 
then they would be substances; and since substances have nothing in com-
mon with one another, the will and the intellect could not interact with one 
another. We also have our first glimpse of the notion of ‘parallelism’ in the 
KV.
Nyden-Bullock concludes with a discussion of Spinoza’s mature views on 
the mind-body union, intellect, truth, falsity, and error, and the parallelism 
that grounds his philosophy. While in the KV Spinoza still allows for some 
interaction between the mind and body, the Ethics completely abolishes that 
possibility. Indeed, in the Ethics we find Spinoza’s thoroughgoing notion of 
parallelism — from the attributes of God through the entire spectrum of in-
finite and finite modes. Spinoza makes it clear that parallelism entails iden-
tity. Hence, each thing that is expressed under the attributes (whether an 
infinite mode or a particular finite entity) is one in nature. So, ‘the face of 
the whole universe’ and ‘the idea of the face of the whole universe’ are just 
two expressions of one thing, as are any particular finite body and the idea of 
that particular finite body. Nyden-Bullock also discusses the elimination of 
any distinction between the will and intellect, calling it Spinoza’s ‘most radi-
cal departure from the Cartesian theory of error’ (122). Spinoza claims that 
there is no difference between singular volitions and ideas — both are simply 
thoughts in the intellect. Further, since the intellect is not free, neither is the 
will. For Spinoza, error has nothing to do with the will; rather, error is just 
a privation of ideas. Nyden-Bullock concludes that while Spinoza’s mature 
philosophy grounds his political theory, his philosophical theory was largely 
the result of his Radical Cartesian political views.
What seems to be missing from this interesting and nicely written histori-
cal perspective on Spinoza’s political and philosophical views is a literature 
review. A reader new to the subject might require a foundation of historical 
and contemporary views on the subject as a primer to Nyden-Bullock’s study. 
Without this foundation, it could be difficult for a reader to evaluate her 
claims about the influence on and order of Spinoza’s political and philosophi-
cal theories.
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